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Decision Making and Underperformance in Competitive
Environments: Evidence from the National Hockey League
Gueorgui I. Kolev, Gonçalo Pina and Federico Todeschini*

I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental implication of rational decision making is that an expansion of an
agent’s choice set must not result in a worse outcome for him. If the agent
optimally takes advantage of the larger set of possibilities he should make
himself better off. If the expansion of his choice is immaterial, the agent would
at least be as well off as before the expansion. This no longer holds true if the
agent is irrational and makes suboptimal choices. If the agent is irrational, an
expansion of the choice set can possibly result in a suboptimal choice which was
previously not available, and therefore lead to a worse outcome.
Various deviations from rationality have been documented in laboratory
experiments. People can be irrational and behavior and choices that are inconsistent with normative economic or statistical models can be induced in the
laboratory (Hogarth, 2007; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Hogarth, and
Reder, 1987). The outstanding question is whether irrationality is pervasive in
real life settings with high stakes, where agents’ behavior and choices naturally
occur.
In this paper we study rational decision making and performance in a real life
situation. We use data from all the shootouts from the National Hockey League
(NHL) between the seasons 2005/06 and 2011/12. The shootout is a tournament
where two teams of professionals compete performing a task sequentially. The
task is a penalty shot. The professionals are extremely well paid hockey players.
Our sample includes data from before and after an exogenous NHL policy
*
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change. Before the exogenous policy change, in the season 2005/06, the NHL
rules of the game stipulated that the away teams had to always start the shootout,
and perform the task first in the sequence. After the policy change, in the seasons
from 2006/07 to 2011/12 home teams were given the choice to decide who will
start the shootout. This exogenous expansion of the choice set of home teams
allows us to study decision making and performance.
These data are interesting because they feature professionals that are familiar
with the tournament and the task, and that have substantial incentives to excel.
The shootout was introduced in the 2005/06 season as a method of determining
the winning team if a match is still drawn following overtime. In a shootout both
teams take penalty shots until a winner is determined, while the opposing team’s
goalkeeper tries to stop the penalty shots from being scored. As a method of
determining the winner of a game, the shootout has been widely used in other
North-American and International competitions. The penalty shot task is used
during regular time to punish specific infractions. Furthermore our dataset is
fully comprehensive and includes all the shootouts in the NHL in a short period
of time. Therefore we have a tournament that is repeated a substantial number of
times by the same highly skilled professionals with incentives to excel.1
The most interesting aspect of our policy experiment is that after the policy
change home teams enjoy an expanded choice set. If home teams are taking the
rational decision, they should move first only when this is optimal, and this
should lead them to win the tournament more often after the policy change.
The main finding of this paper is that in fact after given the choice, home teams
most of the time move first in the sequence, and this results in lower winning
frequency for them. In other words, we find that a larger choice set causally leads
to different choices and to worse performance. Therefore, a greatly expanded
choice set leads to worse outcomes for home teams.
The second finding of this paper is that it matters whether home teams start the
shootout or not. We can reject the null hypothesis that the order does not matter for
winning the shootout. Unfortunately, our data does not have randomization on the
sequence order, therefore we can not attribute our findings of decreased performance purely to the sequence order. Other factors could be driving both the choice
1.
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We argue that strategic considerations about letting the other team win play an insignificant role in our
data. One potential concern would be that teams might be interested in deliberately losing games as soon
as they are out of the playoff race. The rationale behind this strategy would be to benefit from a better
position in the draft of new players entering the League in the next season. The order of the draft pick
is determined by a combination of last season’s standing and a lottery system. For example, the last team
in the table has a 25% probability of gaining the right to the first pick. Although this is still the highest
possible probability of getting the first pick in the draft, it reduces the benefits from losing on purpose.
More importantly, if a team wanted to lose on purpose it would never wait for the shootout. The reason
is that a loss following regular time is still rewarded with a point, while a loss in regular time is not
rewarded with any points. In any case, the robustness checks described in Section IV show that the issue
of losing on purpose is not a reason for concern in our NHL data.
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Table 1
Description of the dataset
Season

Games

Shootouts

Shots

Goal %

HT First %

2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12

1230
1230
1230
1230
1230
1230
1230

145
164
156
159
184
149
181

981
1215
1058
1059
1398
1058
1207

33.64
32.76
32.51
33.71
32.12
30.62
33.89

0
64.0
65.4
79.9
82.1
81.2
82.3

All

8610

1138

7976

32.74

66.3

Notes: Dataset includes all the shootouts in the NHL between 2005/06 and 2011/12. HT First column
denotes the fraction of Home Teams starting the shootout. The fraction of home teams choosing to
start first over all season when they can choose, i.e., from 2006/07 to 2011/12, is 76%.

of whether to start the shootout and the outcome of the shootout. E.g., it could be
a selection effect – weaker teams choose to start and lose more often. In face of
these selection problems, in the remaining of the paper we explore different
explanations and highlight which explanations are consistent with the data.
Our results are consistent with an explanation based on overconfidence in a
setting where there is psychological pressure from lagging behind in the tournament. In a seminal paper Svenson (1981) documented that 93% of a US
sample and 69% of a Swedish sample of drivers believe to be more skillful
drivers than the median driver. Park and Santos-Pinto (2010) show that agents are
overconfident about their own ability in poker and chess tournaments.
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) document an advantage of shooting first
in the context of soccer penalty shootouts. In their random assignment data,
teams starting the shootout win with 60% probability. This result has been
challenged by Kocher, Lenz, and Sutter (2012) using a different dataset and by
Feri, Innocenti and Pin (2013) in a field experiment.2 Using survey data,
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) also document that coaches and managers prefer to go first in the shootout, with the explicit objective of putting
opponents under pressure.
We argue that in hockey shootouts there is an advantage of shooting
second. In soccer, shooting first is nearly identical to scoring first, as the
unconditional probability of scoring a goal from a penalty kick is very high,
about 72%.3 In hockey however, there is an important distinction between
shooting first and scoring first, as the chance of realizing a goal from a penalty
shot is relatively low, about 33% (see Table 1). If psychological pressure from
2.
3.

We discuss how these results relate to our interpretation in Section V.
Calculated from the data Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) provided for replication at http://
www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.5.2548.
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lagging in the partial score is present in hockey shootouts, the advantage
should fall on the team that shoots second. But if home teams are overconfident regarding their ability to score first, they may start the shootout too often
with the objective of getting the opponent’s shooter under pressure. Once they
fail to materialize this advantage, this releases the opponent’s team from
psychological pressure and leads home teams starting the shootout to
underperform.
We look at shot by shot data and study shooter performance conditional on the
shooter’s team being in advantage, disadvantage or in a situation of potential
advantage in the shootout. The first two are defined as a positive and a negative
partial score, respectively. We define potential advantage as a situation where the
shootout is tied, but the shooter’s team has one more shot to take than the goalie’s
team. We find no significant effects on the probability of scoring from being in
disadvantage. We do find statistically significant positive effects on the probability of scoring from being in advantage in the shootout – which could justify the
desire to move first. We also find statistically significant positive coefficients
from being in a situation of potential advantage. These correlations are consistent
with the explanation we propose.
Finally, we consider a number of other potential explanations for our data:
negative selection in terms of quality of home teams that get to the shootout,
choice inducing choking, losing on purpose and learning. We can reject that
home teams getting to the shootout are of less observable quality relative to away
teams after the policy change. We find no direct evidence of increased choking
for home team shooters following the policy change, nor evidence that losing on
purpose is driving our results. Regarding learning, if we drop the first two
seasons following the policy change, when the probability of starting the
shootout is around 65%, our results are even stronger.
We proceed as follows. Section II describes what a shootout is, and our data.
Section III describes our test of rationality. The results of our analysis of the
NHL policy experiment, as well as the analysis of potential explanations are in
Section IV. Section V concludes.

II. SHOOTOUTS DATA

II.1. The shootout and the penalty shot
The shootout in the NHL consists of a series of three alternating shots per
team. The team with a higher score following these three shots is the winner.
If one team scores the first two shots, and the other team misses the first two
shots, the third shot is not performed as it would not change the outcome of
the shootout.
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If after each team has taken three shots the score remains tied, the shootout
proceeds to a “sudden death” format. In the “sudden death” rounds, if one team
scores and the other team does not, the team that scored wins and this completes
the shootout. If both teams do not score or if both teams do score in the “sudden
death” round, they proceed to the next “sudden death” round, and this process in
principle can continue ad infinitum.
The coach of each team determines the shooters and the order they shoot. No
player may shoot twice before everyone eligible has shot. The rules state that the
home team has the choice of shooting first or second (NHL Official Rules, 2011).
The exception is season 2005/06, when the home team always had to shoot
second (NHL Official Rules, 2005).
The procedure for a penalty shot is exactly the same as the procedure for a
long standing foul in hockey during regular time. Each penalty shot involves two
players: a shooter and a goalkeeper. The shooter takes the puck from the center
face-off spot and attempts to score while keeping the puck in motion, while the
goalkeeper attempts to cover his goal from the puck. Each penalty shot takes
around 3 to 5 seconds to be completed. It is a well defined task with immediately
observed outcomes.4

II.2. Data
We use data from the National Hockey League (www.nhl.com). The dataset
comprises 1138 shootouts over seven seasons. Table 1 summarizes the data on
shootouts and games. What we can gather from Table 1 is that shootouts are very
important in hockey, as a large fraction of games are decided through a shootout.
We can also observe that the unconditional probability of being successful in a
penalty shot is about 33%.
There are two main advantages of using this dataset relative to other tournaments data. First, we have 1138 shootouts, and this is considerably larger than
previous studies using sports natural, quasi-natural and policy experiments.
Second, this dataset is fully comprehensive in that it includes all the shootouts in
the NHL to date. Because the data spans a relatively short time period – only 7
years – a large proportion of the agents involved in the shootouts does not change
in the data. This means we have a tournament, the shootout, that is repeated a
4.

The Penalty shot rules: . . . place the puck on the center face-off spot and the player taking the shot will,
on the instruction of the Referee (by blowing his whistle), play the puck from there and shall attempt to
score on the goalkeeper. The puck must be kept in motion towards the opponents goal line and once it
is shot, the play shall be considered complete. No goal can be scored on a rebound of any kind (an
exception being the puck off the goal post or crossbar, then the goalkeeper and then directly into the
goal), and any time the puck crosses the goal line or comes to a complete stop, the shot shall be
considered complete.
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large number of times by the same highly skilled professionals, that have
incentives to excel.5
III. SETTING UP THE TEST OF RATIONALITY
In this section we describe the test of rationality.
Let us denote by pb the probability of a home team winning the tournament
before the policy change when NHL regulation stipulated that home teams had
to shoot second. Let us denote by pa the probability of a home team winning the
tournament after the policy change when NHL regulation gave home teams
the right to choose whether to start or not. As discussed in the introduction, the
expansion of the home team choice set implies that the null hypothesis of
rationality versus the alternative of irrational home team behavior after the policy
change is

H o : pa ≥ pb versus H A : pa < pb
where the equality pa = pb holds if and only if the choice of whether to start a
shootout or not is irrelevant for winning the tournament. In words, if home teams
act rationally, they are more likely to win the shootout after the policy change
when they enjoy expanded choice set. If home teams act irrationally, they might
make themselves worse off under the expanded choice set after the policy
change, because they might choose a suboptimal option (to start first in the
shootout when this is undesirable) which was not available before the policy
change.
The null hypothesis of rationality is a composite null hypothesis. Standard
statistical hypothesis testing is ill equipped to handle such situations. Therefore
we will proceed as is customary in the literature by considering a worse scenario
and thereby testing

H o′ : pa = pb versus H A : pa < pb
To this end, let the random variable W be the number of times the home team
wins. Let N be the number of observations, Wo be the observed number of times
the home team has won the shootout after the policy change, and pa = pb under
H o′ , be the probability of winning a shootout after the policy change. Then
5.
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Because shootouts are so infrequent in soccer, Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) only have 269
shootouts – of which 129 are eligible for their randomized experiment. Kocher et al. (2012) extend
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) randomized experiment sample to 709 shootouts taking place
over 30 years, 540 with known shooting order. Both Kocher et al. (2012) and Apesteguia and
Palacios-Huerta (2010) combine shootouts from different competitions over about 30 years and have a
significant number of shootouts within each competition for which the shooting order is not known.
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Table 2
One and two-sided exact binomial tests
Home Teams (HTs)
Season

Shootouts

2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
Seasons 2006/07–2011/12
2006/07–2011/12 & HT shoots first
2006/07–2011/12 & HT shoots second

145
164
156
159
184
149
181
993
755
238

%
won

Rationality Test
No Effect Test
One sided P-value Two sided P-value

51.72
48.17
49.36
48.43
49.46
38.93
45.30
46.72
47.68
43.70

HT winning
prob. 51.72%

HT winning
prob. 50%

–
0.20
0.30
0.23
0.29
0.001
0.05
0.001
0.014
0.01

0.74
0.69
0.94
0.75
0.94
0.01
0.23
0.04
0.22
0.06

Notes: In the rationality one-sided test (column 4, Rationality Test) we assume that the true probability of home team winning the shootout after the policy change is 51.72%, i.e., the observed
probability of home team winning in the season 2005/06 before the policy change. In the no effect test
(column 5, No Effect Test) we present the results of a two-sided binomial test assuming that the home
team winning probability is 50%.

Wo
Wo
⎛ N⎞
⎛ N⎞
N −i
N −i
Pr [W ≤ Wo ] = ∑ ⎜ ⎟ pbi (1 − pb ) = ∑ ⎜ ⎟ 0.517i (1 − 0.517)
⎠
⎠
⎝
⎝
i
i
i=0
i=0

gives us the probability of observing as bad as documented in the first row of
Table 2 or worse performance of home teams after the policy change under H o′ .
As the binomial cumulative distribution function in the above expression is
decreasing in pb this will in turn give us a conservative upper bound on
Pr[W ≤ Wo] under Ho, i.e., it will give us a conservative test of rationality of
home team behavior. Table 2 collects the results of this test in column 4.
In column 5 of Table 2 we present the results of a two-sided binomial test for
the null hypothesis that the probability of a home team winning is 50%. Note that
given that we do not have random assignment of the shootout order there is no
reason a priori to expect the winning probability to be 50%. Yet the probability
of a home team winning equal to 50% is an interesting no effect null hypothesis.
IV. RESULTS

IV.1. Rationality test
Focus first on the row “Seasons 2006/07–2011/12” of Table 2. This is the test of
rationality carried out on all seasons where the home team has the choice of
© 2015 The Authors Kyklos: International Review of Social Sciences Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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whether to start or not. Our results suggest that the probability of observing as
bad or worse performance of home teams as the fraction of time they actually
win the shootouts after the policy change assuming that H o′ : pa = pb holds true,
is very low, only 0.001. In other words, we are able to reject the null hypothesis
of rationality Ho : pa ≥ pb at least at the 0.1% significance level. Remember that
0.001 is a conservative upper bound for the p-value of the test Ho : pa ≥ pb versus
HA : pa < pb.
In the last two rows of Table 2 we decompose home teams according to their
choice of whether to shoot first in the shootout. Table 1 shows that home teams
overwhelmingly choose to shoot first: they shoot first 76% of the times they are
allowed to choose. We find that the winning probability of a home team that
shoots first is 47.68%. This is smaller than the winning probability in the season
when home teams were forced to shoot second of 51.72%, and the difference is
significant at the 1.4% significance level. Perhaps surprisingly, home teams
deciding to shoot second do even worse: they win only 43.7% of the shootouts,
and this is significantly smaller than 51.72% at the 1% significance level.6

IV.2. No effect test
Turn now to column 5 of Table 2. Our results for the first season, a sample of 145
shootouts without selection, appear to support the view that there is no significant difference between shooting first or second. However our results for the rest
of the seasons where the home teams have the choice to start or not, show that the
null hypothesis that the home team winning probability is equal to 50% can be
rejected at the 4% significance level using a two-sided binomial test, i.e., the two
sided p-value of the No Effect Test is 0.04.

IV.3. Potential explanations
In this subsection we explore some possible explanations for the results documented in the previous subsections. Our exploration here is not causal, given the
non-randomized nature of our data. We propose in Section I that overconfidence
in the presence of psychological pressure can be an explanation for our results.
We highlight that in hockey it is hard to score a penalty shot, and a team going
first will find itself frequently failing to materialize the shot, thus releasing the
6.
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Following the policy change only a small fraction of home teams choose to shoot second. This result
could reflect selection on the teams choosing not to start the shootout. Another explanation would be the
existence of heterogeneity in the incidence of psychological effects in competitive environments, as
documented by Feri et al. (2013) in a field experiment. If a large mass of home teams that would win the
shootout going second, decide instead to start the shootout and lose, we should observe a decrease in the
probability of home teams winning in both sets of teams.
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opponent team from psychological pressure. We can use our data to see if these
effects are present. We also investigate explanations based on home team quality,
choice induced choking and learning.

IV.3.1. Overconfidence and psychological pressure
To investigate this explanation we explore shot-level data. We model the probability of scoring a penalty shot as a function of a full set of dummies that capture
whether the shooter’s team is in Advantage (A), Disadvantage (DA), or Tied in
the shootout at the moment of the shot. We also divide Ties into two situations:
one where the number of shots taken by both teams prior to the current shot is the
same (Neuter), and one where the number of shots taken by the opponent’s team
is larger (Potential Advantage). The latter situation is interesting because it
comprises a situation of Potential Advantage (PA) where a team following in the
sequence can benefit from an opponent’s miss. To control for pressure associated
with game deciding shots, we divide shot situations into game deciding shots
(DS) and non-game deciding shots (NDS). We define game deciding shots as
shots for which the outcome decides the game immediately. We control also for
whether the shot was taken by a shooter from the home team or by a shooter from
an away team, in each of the categories described before. Finally, for each
specification, we add round and shooter fixed effects. Round fixed effects remove
the time invariant effect of a shot being taken at a specific round, where round #1
is defined as shots 1 and 2, round #2 as shots 3 and 4, and so on and so forth.
Shooter fixed effects control for the time invariant effect of a shot being taken by
a specific individual. Controlling for these is important to capture the effect of
later rounds and shooter ability on the probability of scoring.
Table 3 collects the results of the linear probability model for different regression specifications on the full sample of shots. In the Supplementary Information
(SI), we present results for the Logit and Probit models with the same specifications as in Table 3, and the results are similar. In all of them the dependent
variable corresponds to a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the outcome
of the penalty shot is a goal, and 0 otherwise. In column (1) we focus on the
categories that capture the partial result of the shootout: Advantage, Disadvantage and Potential Advantage. The omitted category is ties where teams have
taken the same number of shots, referred as the Neuter category. Relative to the
omitted category, we can see that being in Advantage is related to a higher
probability of scoring the shot, significant at the 5% level. All other categories
are not significantly different from the omitted category. In column (4) we add
round and shooter fixed effects, and the results are similar. (The omitted category
in column (4) is ties where teams have taken the same number of shots (the
Neuter category) in the first round.)
© 2015 The Authors Kyklos: International Review of Social Sciences Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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Table 3
Shot by shot analysis
Goal

(1)

(2)

−0.0009
(0.0135)
Potential Advantage 0.0143
(0.0131)
(PA)
Advantage (A)
0.0417**
(0.0204)
Home Team (HT)

(3)

Disadvantage (DA)

DA × Non-Deciding
(NDS)
PA × NDS

−0.0160
(0.0173)
0.0113
(0.0173)
0.0381**
(0.0160)
0.0640*
(0.0337)
−0.0133
(0.0172)
−0.0167
(0.0170)
0.0308
(0.0239)

A × NDS
DA × Deciding
(DS)
PA × DS
A × DS
DA × NDS × HT
PA × NDS × HT
A × NDS × HT
DA × DS × HT
PA × DS × HT
A × DS × HT
DA × NDS × Away
Team (AT)
PA × NDS × AT
A × NDS × AT
DA × DS × AT
PA × DS × AT
A × DS × AT
Shooter and Round
Fixed Effects
Constant
Observations
R-squared

No

No

0.3200***
(0.0085)
7,976
0.0007

0.3200***
(0.0085)
7,976
0.0019

−0.0403
(0.0245)
0.0460*
(0.0256)
0.0707*
(0.0415)
0.0116
(0.0248)
−0.0492*
(0.0290)
0.0611*
(0.0343)
0.0439*
(0.0249)
0.0263
(0.0213)
0.0511
(0.0575)
−0.0409*
(0.0239)
−0.0083
(0.0231)
−0.0027
(0.0336)
No

(4)

(5)

0.0053
(0.0147)
0.0163
(0.0144)
0.0438*
(0.0231)

−0.0217
(0.0192)
0.0169
(0.0195)
0.0382**
(0.0184)
0.0783**
(0.0376)
−0.0098
(0.0205)
−0.0163
(0.0206)
0.0262
(0.0269)

Yes

0.3305*** 0.2938***
(0.0135)
(0.0124)
7,976
7,976
0.0041
0.0842

(6)

Yes
0.2846***
(0.0132)
7,976
0.0849

−0.0292
(0.0274)
0.0700**
(0.0281)
0.0761*
(0.0451)
0.0182
(0.0283)
−0.0205
(0.0331)
0.0492
(0.0379)
0.0402
(0.0276)
0.0114
(0.0244)
0.0738
(0.0631)
−0.0402
(0.0275)
−0.0244
(0.0269)
−0.0028
(0.0365)
Yes
0.2978***
(0.0184)
7,976
0.0866

Notes: The dependent variable Goal equals 1 if the shooter scores the penalty shot and 0 otherwise.
Dummies and omitted categories are defined in the text. Coefficients are estimated by Ordinary Least
Squares. Columns (1)–(3) present the results of regressions on different shot decompositions. Columns
(4)–(6) add round and shooter fixed effects. Standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and
arbitrary correlation within a game in parentheses: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

74

© 2015 The Authors Kyklos: International Review of Social Sciences Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

DECISION MAKING AND UNDERPERFORMANCE IN COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS

In column (2) we divide the categories defined above between Deciding
shots (DS) and Non-deciding shots (NDS). Note that we do not include the
dummy for non-game deciding shot directly. This is because the omitted category of ties with the same number of shots is by definition a non-game deciding shot. When we divide shots between deciding and non-deciding we observe
that being in advantage in a non-deciding shot is associated with 6.4 percentage
points higher probability of scoring relative to the omitted category, and this is
significant at the 10% level. Interestingly, being in Advantage in decisive shots
is not associated with a higher probability of scoring relative to the omitted
category. We observe also that potential advantage in non-deciding shots is now
associated with a 3.8 percentage points larger probability of scoring relative to
the omitted category. Once again, being in disadvantage is not associated with
the probability of scoring relative to the omitted category. As expected, the
categories for game deciding shots are associated with lower probabilities of
scoring the shot. In column (5) we add round and shooter fixed effects, and the
results are similar.
Finally, we investigate how these relationships depend on whether a shooter
belongs to the Home Team (HT). Column (3) includes a dummy capturing if the
shooter is from the home team, and the omitted category is now Neuter, and the
shot is taken by a shooter from the Away Team (AT). Interestingly, the positive
associations between scoring and being in advantage and potential advantage for
non-game deciding shots hold only for home team shooters. Column (6) shows
that the result is robust to the introduction of shooter and round fixed effects. This
result suggests that releasing a shooter from pressure has a larger effect on
shooters that belong to the home teams, a result that is consistent with Dohmen
(2008), who shows that soccer shooters from home teams choke under friendly
pressure.

IV.3.2. Quality, choice induced choking, losing on purpose and learning
Another explanation we consider is whether following the policy change the
quality of teams getting to the shootout changed. This could be a consequence of
different strategies prior to the shootout. Given that home teams can now choose
whether to take the penalty shot first or second, home teams of lower quality
could try to take the game into the shootout to benefit from this advantage. If the
lower home team quality effect still dominates any potential advantage from
choosing the order in the shootout, we would observe a decrease in the performance of home teams, independently of their choice. Although team quality is
ultimately unobservable, we can use their overall league table standing prior to
the shootout as a proxy, and look for a decrease in the quality of home teams
following the policy change. In fact, we find a significant increase in the mean
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quality of home teams, from 17th place to 14th place (mean classifications
rounded, lower values mean higher classification; two-sample Wilcoxon ranksum (Mann-Whitney) test: p-value = 0.0043). Interestingly, we find also an
increase in the average quality of away teams getting to the shootout, from 16th
place to 14th place (mean classifications rounded, two-sample Wilcoxon ranksum (Mann-Whitney) test: p-value = 0.03). If we look at the difference between
home and away teams’ classification, there is no significant difference following
the policy change (two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test:
p-value = 0.5513).7
We also directly test for choking under friendly pressure. Dohmen (2008)
finds that in German soccer penalties shooters from the home team are more
likely to choke, where choking is defined as failing to score a penalty shot
because the shot fails to hit the goal. This represents a situation where, arguably,
the intervention of the goalie was immaterial. If the choice of whether to go first
or second puts players from the home teams under differential friendly pressure,
this could explain our results of reduced performance for home teams. If these
effects are present in our data, the policy change should have led to an increase
in the relationship between choking and having a shooter from the home team.
We test the above hypothesis in Table 4. All shooters choke more in the choice
regime after the policy change when home teams decide who starts the shootout,
relative to the first no-choice season. However, home team shooters do not choke
more, relative to away team shooters. More importantly, the hypothesis that
decreased home teams performance after the policy change is due to increased
home team choking after the policy change is refuted by the data. The interaction
term between choice regime (after policy change seasons) and home team
shooter dummies is negative and insignificant. Therefore if anything, home team
shooters choke less relative to away team shooters in the choice regime seasons
compared to how much they choked relative to away team shooters in the
no-choice seasons.
In Footnote 1 we discussed the validity of our data as a tournament model,
where both teams have full incentives to succeed. There are some incentives for
teams not making it to the playoffs to lose games on purpose, which could bias
our results. As a robustness check, we drop the last month of regular seasons (75
shootouts), as well as the last two months (293 shootouts) and redo the rationality test presented in Table 1. Our results are in line with previous results for the

7.
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We can also use this quality measure to study if there is observable heterogeneity of home teams
choosing or not choosing to start the shootout. We find no significant difference in quality between home
teams choosing to go first or to go second (two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test:
p-value = 0.3302). The same is true for away teams (two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney)
test: p-value = 0.3592) – there is no significant difference in observable quality between away teams that
have been chosen to shoot first, and away teams that have been chosen to shoot second.
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Table 4
Choking
Choke
Home Team Shooter
(HTS)
Choice Regime (CR)

(1)
0.0066
(0.0081)

Interaction (HTS × CR)
Shooter and Round
Fixed Effects
Constant
Observations
R-squared

No

(2)

(3)

0.0248
(0.0204)
0.0340** 0.0442***
(0.0137)
(0.0162)
−0.0213
(0.0223)
No
No

0.1662*** 0.1397***
(0.0060)
(0.0129)
7,976
7,976
0.0001
0.0009

0.1277***
(0.0148)
7,976
0.0010

(4)

(5)

0.0059
(0.0086)
0.0265
(0.0163)

Yes

Yes

(6)
0.0222
(0.0230)
0.0355*
(0.0195)
−0.0189
(0.0248)
Yes

0.1690*** 0.1493*** 0.1385***
(0.0095)
(0.0164)
(0.0192)
7,976
7,976
7,976
0.1051
0.1054
0.1055

Notes: The dependent variable Choke equals 1 if the shooter misses the penalty shot by sending the
puck wide, high or hitting the bars, and equals 0 otherwise. Coefficients are estimated by Ordinary
Least Squares. Home Team Shooter is equal to 1 when the shooter is from a home team, and 0
otherwise. Choice Regime is equal to 1 for the seasons where home teams decide whether to start the
shootout or not (seasons 2006/07–2011/12) and 0 otherwise. Interaction takes the value of 1 when
both the shooter is from a home team and the season is a choice season, and 0 otherwise. Standard
errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within a game in parentheses:
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

full sample, and strongly significant.8 We also drop observations in the last
month of shootouts involving teams that ultimately did not make it to the
playoffs, and results are unchanged.9
Finally, we discuss learning. Looking at Table 1 it is possible to see that the
first two seasons following the introduction of the choice for home teams are also
the seasons with a closer split between home teams going first and home teams
going second. Interestingly, they are also among the seasons with a higher
winning frequency for home teams. In fact, our rationality test is not rejected for
the first two seasons with choice, only for the latter seasons. Following these two
seasons home teams choose to start much more often, and performance significantly decreases. Figure 1 plots winning and starting frequencies for home teams
by month for each season. The main thing to note in this figure is that there is no
8.

9.

Omitting the last month of the regular season, the winning probability for home teams in the first season
is 50.0%, compared to 46.5% in the seasons with choice. This probability is different at the 5% level:
one sided p-value = 0.018. Omitting the last two months these probabilities are 50.5% and 45.1%,
respectively, and they are different at the 1% level: one sided p-value= 0.002.
More concretely, we redo the test omitting the shootouts played in the last month of the season that
involve a home or away team that ultimately did not make it to the playoff. Our results are unchanged
and significant at the 1% level. The winning probability for home teams in the first season is 50.4%,
compared to 46.5% in the seasons with choice. This probability is different at the 5% level: one sided
p-value = 0.009.

© 2015 The Authors Kyklos: International Review of Social Sciences Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

77

GUEORGUI I. KOLEV/GONÇALO PINA/FEDERICO TODESCHINI
Figure 1

Winning and Starting Frequencies for Home Teams by month

Notes: This figure plots winning (solid line) and starting the shootout (dashed line) frequencies for
home teams by month for each season. The panel “All” collects all seasons. Each NHL regular
season takes place between October and April.

clear trend in the winning probabilities for home teams within the season when
the shootout was introduced (2005–06) nor for both winning probabilities and
the probability to start the shootout within the season when the choice was
introduced (2006–07). This suggests that learning by home teams did not play a
major role in these two seasons.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we study a policy experiment that resulted from a change in the
National Hockey League (NHL) rules regulating shootouts. In the first season in
which shootouts were introduced as a means to determine the winner in case the
hockey match is still drawn after overtime, home teams had to shoot second. In
the rest of the seasons, the NHL changed the rule and gave home teams the right
to choose whether to start first or second. We use this policy experiment to devise
a test of whether home teams behave rationally.
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We are able to reject the null hypothesis that home teams act rationally at least
at the 0.1% significance level. We are also able to reject the null hypothesis that
the home teams winning probability in the seasons when they choose whether to
start or not is equal to 50% at the 4% significance level, versus the two sided
alternative that the home teams winning probability is different from 50%.
We discuss one interpretation of our findings: overconfidence leading home
teams to start too often in an environment where psychological pressure
from lagging behind is present. Contrary to what is argued in Apesteguia and
Palacios-Huerta (2010), our results suggest that agents are not perfectly aware of
the interaction between psychological pressure and low scoring probabilities (in
hockey the unconditional probability of scoring penalty shot is 33%, versus 72%
in soccer) and do not respond optimally to it. Due to the nature of our data, the
exploration of the mechanisms behind our findings is not causal. Understanding
the relationship between tasks with different success probabilities, decision
making, psychological pressure and performance in dynamic tournaments
remains an exciting field for empirical and experimental work.
Finally, our paper also relates to the existence of negative psychological
pressure from lagging behind in competitive environments. Recent work by
Kocher et al. (2012) and Feri et al. (2013) questions the existence of this phenomenon. Kocher et al. (2012) use a super-sample of the Apesteguia and
Palacios-Huerta (2010) soccer data to show that there is no statistically significant difference between shooting first or second in soccer. Feri et al. (2013) use
data from a field experiment where they can control for individual heterogeneity.
They find that lagging behind does not affect negatively second-mover’s scoring
probability. They show that there is a positive effect as the second-mover’s
scoring probability improves significantly when free throws are worthy, with
heterogeneity playing a role.
Our results for the first season, a sample of 145 shootouts without selection,
appear to support the view that there is no significant difference between shooting first or second. However our results for the rest of the seasons where the
home teams have the choice to start or not, show that the null hypothesis that the
home team winning probability is equal to 50% can be rejected at the 4%
significance level. Therefore, our interpretation of our results is that first, in
hockey it matters whether a team starts the shootout or not. Second, in hockey
home teams do not understand correctly the implications of starting first and
behave irrationally, thereby performing worse when given the choice of starting
first when compared to a situation when they were not given this choice.
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Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this
article at the publisher’s web-site:
Table SI1. Shot by shot analysis - Logit conditional marginal effects
Table SI2. Shot by shot analysis - Probit conditional marginal effects
SUMMARY
We find evidence of suboptimal decisions leading to underperformance in a policy experiment where two
teams of professionals compete in a tournament (National Hockey League shootout) performing a task
(penalty shot) sequentially. Before an exogenous policy change, home teams had to perform the task second
in the sequence. After the policy change, home teams were given the choice to lead or to follow in the
sequence. Home teams should move first only when this is optimal, and this should lead them to winning the
tournament more often. We find that after given the choice, home teams most of the time choose to move first
in the sequence, and this results in a lower winning frequency for them. Contrary to what economic theory
would predict, we find that an expanded choice set can lead to worse outcomes for the agents.
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